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RECENT DECISIONS
Editor-EDWiN H.

SHEPPARD

ASSOCIATIONS-RIGHT OF A TRADE UNION TO EXPEL MEMBERS

THEREoF.-Plaintiff, a member of an unincorporated trade association, had brought an action against its officers charging that they had
violated the constitution and by-laws and requiring them to account
to the union for moneys alleged to have been misappropriated by
them. In connection with the action, plaintiff, together with other
members of the association, distributed to their fellow members circular letters explaining the action and the reason therefor. The
recording secretary of the union thereafter presented charges against
the plaintiff to the association at one of its regular meetings, specifying, in substance, (1) that plaintiff had violated the union's constitution in bringing the action; (2) that he had circulated letters of a
libelous nature concerning officers; and (3) that he had violated his
oath of obligation by committing the acts charged in "(1)" and
"(2)." The executive board, after hearing proof, sustained the
charges and the union, at a regular meeting, fined plaintiff for the
violation specified in "(1)" and "(2)" and expelled him from the
union for the third. In this action to have the proceedings adjudged
to be null and void and to procure plaintiff's reinstatement, plaintiff's
complaint was dismissed. On appeal, by permission, from a judgment of the Appellate Division unanimously affirming the Special
Term, held, reversed (Pound and O'Brien, JI., dissenting). Plaintiff was expelled without power and illegally, and should be reinstated. He is also entitled to recover damages for loss of wages.
Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N. Y. 277, 177 N. E. 833 (1931).
The relations between members of an association are contractual.
The terms of the contract are found in the constitution and by-laws
which enumerate the privileges secured and duties assumed by those
who have become members, 1 and the implied obligation of members
to loyally support the association in the attainment of its proper
purposes. 2 If a tribunal of the association finds a member should be
expelled because he has committed the offenses charged and the constitution and by-laws reasonably provide that such acts constitute
sufficient cause for expulsion, the proceeding will not be reviewed by
the courts provided the member was accorded a fair trial and pro'Strauss v. Thoman, 60 Misc. 72, 111 N. Y. Supp. 745, aff'd, 129 App. Div.
905, 113 N. Y. Supp. 1148 (1st Dept. 1908); Ranken v. Probey, 131 App. Div.
328. 115 N. Y. Supp. 832 (3d Dept. 1909) ; Grassi Bros. v. O'Rourke, 89 Misc.
234, 153 N. Y. Supp. 493 (1915).
SPolin v. Kaplan, 257 N. Y. 277, 283, 177 N. E. 833, 834 (1931), citing
Otto v. Journeymen Tailors' Protective & Benevolent Union, 75 Calif. 308,
314, 17 Pac. 217, 219 (1888) ; Weiss v. Musical Mut. Protective Union, 189 Pa.
446, 451, 42 At. 118, 120 (1899). See also Brennan v. United Hatters, 73
N. J. L. 729, 65 Atl. 165 (1906).
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vided, further, that there was evidence to sustain the finding.3 The
courts, however, strictly construe the penal provisions covering the
internal regulations of unions and similar organizations and such
provisions must be in accord with the law of the land. 4 In the principal case, the expulsion could not be predicated upon the fact that
plaintiff had brought a court action, for the constitution and by-laws
did not prohibit resort to the courts, but merely provided for a system
of appeals within the union and its parent body, and also because
"it was the absolute right of the plaintiff to bring the suit, whether he
could successfully maintain it or not, and he might not be expelled
for having so done." 5 The first charge, therefore, failed because the
act charged was not in contravention of the constitution or by-laws or
the implied obligation. 6 As to whether the circulation of the letters
would have justified an expulsion on the ground that it contravened
the implied obligation, query. The court did not pass on that because
the plaintiff had not been expelled but fined on this charge. With
reference to the third charge, since charge No. 1 failed and the
expulsion under the third charge was predicated on guilt of the first
and second charges combined, the penalty must fall. It follows that
plaintiff was expelled without power and illegally and should be
reinstated. While ordinarily courts are loath to interfere in the
internal affairs of unions and other unincorporated membership
bodies, 7 they will protect an individual against wrongful damage,
because it is not the policy of the law to permit members of an association "to suffer without redress from the whims or at the caprice
of those to whom they have in good faith temporarily intrusted themselves and their affairs." 8 Moreover, in view of the fact that in
unionized trades a man's livelihood may depend upon his membership
in the trade union, it is of the utmost importance that courts sedulously protect the rights of men to their union membership. 9 The
pronouncement of the court is in accord with these principles. The
'Belton v. Hatch, 109 N. Y. 593, 17 N. E. 225 (1888); In re Haebler v.
N. Y. Produce Exchange, 149 N. Y. 414, 428, 44 N. E. 87, 91 (1896) ; Wilcox
v. Royal Arcanun, 210 N. Y. 370, 104 N. E. 624 (1914).

.Weston v. Ives, 97 N. Y. 222 (1884); Connell v. Stalker, 21 Misc. 609,

48 N. Y. Supp. 77 (App. T. 1897); Fritz v. Knaub, 57 Misc. 405, 103 N: Y.
Supp. 1003 (Sup. Ct. Orange Co. 1907) ; Robinson v. Dahm, 94 Misc. 729, 159
N. Y. Supp. 1053 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co. 1916); see also Matter of Brown, 34
Misc. 556, 70 N. Y. Supp. 397, aff'd, 66 App. Div. 259, 72 N. Y. Supp. 806,

aff'd, 176 N. Y. 132, 68 N. E. 145 (1903).
SPolin v. Kaplan, supra note 2, at 284, 177 N. E. at 835.

' In re Haebler v. N. Y. Produce Exchange, sapra note 3; Bricklayers'
P. & S. Union v. Bowen, 183 N. Y. Supp. 855, 860, aff'd, 198 App. Div. 967,
189 N. Y. Supp. 938 (4th Dept. 1921); Connell v. Stalker, 21 Misc. 609, 48
N. Y. Supp. 77 (App. T. 1897).
See Chafee, The Interial Affairs of Associations (1930) 43 HARv. L.
Rzv. 993.
' Bricklayers' P. & S. Union v. Bowen, supra note 6, at 859.
9
J'ose v. Savage, 123 Misc. 283, 205 N. Y. Supp. 6 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co.
1924), opinion by Proskauer, J.
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allowance to plaintiff of the earnings which he lost by reason of the
wrongful expulsion was proper.10
R.L.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWSECTION 20 PROVIDING THAT THE DECISION OF THE STATE INDUSTRIAL BOARD "SHALL BE FINAL AS TO ALL QUESTIONS OF FACT"

OF DUE PRocEsS.-Appellant-employer challenges an
award of the State Industrial Board on the ground that the procedure
under the New York State Workmen's Compensation Law deprives
the employer of his property without due process of law in that the
board has been made the final arbiter of the facts without any review
upon the weight of evidence in a court of law. Held, order affirmed
and contention of appellant dismissed. Matter of Helfrick v. Dahlstrom, k1H.D. Co., 256 N. Y. 199, 176 N. E. 141 (1931).
Although the decision of the board upon questions of fact is
conclusive, an appellate court will review the findings to determine
whether there is any evidence to support the award and it may reverse
the award if there be a failure of evidence to support it.' The
provisions of section 20 should be read "decision by the board shall
be final as to all questions of fact which are supported by legal
evidence." 2 To leave to the decision of the board questions of conflict in evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence is not a denial of due process. The due process clause does not
guarantee to the citizen of any state any particular form or method
of state procedure. Its requirements are satisfied if he has reasonable notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present his
claim or defense, due regard being had to the nature of the proceeding
and the character of the rights which may be affected by it. 3 The
United States Supreme COurt, while not passing on the particular
question of the finality of the board's decision on questions of fact,
has said in treating with the New York Compensation Law "no
question is made but that the procedural provisions of the act are
amply adequate to afford the notice and opportunity to be heard,
required by the Fourteenth Amendment." 4 Directly bearing on the
NOT VIOLATIVE

" Merscheim v. Musical Mutual Protective Union, 55 Hun 608, 8 N. Y.
Supp. 702 (1890).
' Glatzl v. Stumpp, 220 N. Y. 71, 114 N. E. 1053 (1917), and cases cited
therein.
'Kade v. Greenhut Co., 193 App. Div. 862, 185 N. Y. Supp. 9 (3d Dept.
1920).
'Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362, 369, 50 Sup. Ct. 299, 302 (1930).
'New York Central R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 207, 37 Sup. Ct.

247, 254 (1917).

